I am a PhD candidate at the Department of Economics of the University of Oxford and a PhD scholar at the Institute for fiscal studies (IFS).
I use innovative micro-data and empirical methods founded in economic theory to study topics in development economics. These include the drivers of internal migration choices and the matching of healthcare workers and facilities at the country level. My work aims to understand migration and location choices of people under constraints, both positive (driven by central policy choices) and normative (from fairness principles). Prior to starting my PhD, I was a senior data analyst at the University of Chicago Urban Labs.
I will be on the 2022-2023 Academic Job Market. [CV]
Fields: Development Economics, Labor Economics, Public Economics
Job Market Paper :
“Antipoverty Policies in a Second-Best Environment: Sorting, Allocative Efficiency, and Internal Migration”
Abstract: Rural antipoverty programs often focus on increasing agricultural productivity by transferring resources to farmers. Yet, many farmers' most productive investment may be in another technology: migration. I explore the impacts of such programs on productivity and on migration. First, I use a difference-in-difference exploiting variations in the roll-out of a Zambian fertilizer input subsidy program (ISP). As expected, the ISP increases rates of fertilizer adoption, yields, and rural labor supply via inmigration. There is an additional two-fold increase in individual outmigration. I show that short-term outmigration (consistent with a relaxed credit constraint) and medium-term oumigration (consistent with structural transformation driven by agricultural productivity gains) account for respectively 30% and 45% of the variance. Household specializing in their comparative advantage can explain these dual results. Second, I generalize these findings with a structural general equilibrium framework accounting for an externality in adoption. When compared with cash and in-kind transfer scenarios, the ISP with resale markets fosters the highest levels of specialization: addressing both the externality and the credit constraints. When farmers’ types are costly to elicit, resale markets can improve the allocative efficiency of programs, turning voucher programs into cash-transfers to re-sellers and an in-kind transfers to net-buyers.